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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction of this case
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(j) because it is
an appeal taken from a final judgment in a civil matter.
This matter was heard by a jury in the Third Judicial
District Court, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon presiding.

After

a six-day trial, the jury found in favor of the defendant, Kirton,
McConkie & Bushnell, and returned a special verdict accordingly.
Defendant's post-trial motion for indemnification for attorneys'
fees was denied.

Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell requests that the

jury verdict be affirmed and that the denial of its motion for
indemnification be reversed.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(1) Whether the trial judge erred in refusing to admit
into evidence the affidavit of Robert Bailie and certain testimony
of Ivan Radman.
(2) Whether the jury's finding of contributory
negligence is supported by competent evidence.
(3) Whether the damage award should be reversed as based
on speculation or conjecture.
ISSUE ON CROSS APPEAL
Whether Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, as an agent of
Western Fiberglass, Inc., is entitled to indemnification for its
costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees incurred in defending Western
Fiberglass' legal malpractice suit against it.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES
Rule 103(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or precludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is one
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was
made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the
context within which questions were asked.
Rule 801(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
The following definitions apply under this article:
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.
Rule 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law
or by these rules.
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time
as the Court reasonably directs, any party may file
written requests that the Court instruct the jury on a
law as set forth in said requests. The Court shall
inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests
prior to instructing the jury; and it shall furnish
counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless
the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given
orally or otherwise waive this requirement. If the
instructions are to be given in writing, all objections
thereto must be made before the instructions are given to
the jury; otherwise, objections may be made to the
instructions after they are given to the jury, but before
the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an
instruction unless he objects thereto. In objecting to
the giving of an instruction, a party must state
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds
for his objection. Notwithstanding the foregoing
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requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and
in the interests of justice, may review the giving of or
failure to give an instruction. Opportunity shall be
given to make objections, and they shall be made out of
the hearing of the jury.
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made
after the court has instructed the jury. The Court shall
not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the Court
states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors
that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of
fact.
Utah Code Ann. Section 16-10-4(2)(a)-(c):
A copy of this section is attached to this brief as
Addendum 3.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an action brought by

Western Fiberglass, Inc. against Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell for
negligence in representing Western in a sale of equipment to
United Fiberglass, Inc.

Western claimed that Kirton, McConkie &

Bushnell (1) failed to perfect a security interest in United's
accounts receivable, and (2) failed to inform Western Fiberglass
that Western's right to repossess the equipment upon United*s
default was subject to the liens of a bank.

B.

Course of Proceedings.

This case was tried to a jury

from December 1, 1987, through December 9, 1987.

The matter was

submitted to the jury by special verdict.

C.

Disposition at Trial Court.

At the close of

Western's case, Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell moved the court for a
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directed verdict,

The court took the motion under advisement.

The case was submitted to the jury by a special verdict.

As to

the equipment claim, the jury found that Kirton had a duty to
advise Western Fiberglass, Inc. that Western's right to take the
equipment from United Fiberglass, Inc. upon default was subject to
the lien of the bank.
advised.

The jury also found that Western was so

As to the accounts receivable claim, the jury found that

Western subordinated its interest in United*s accounts receivable
to Sovran Bank and that Western and Kirton were both 50 percent
negligent.
Following the trial, Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell moved
the court for an order requiring Western Fiberglass to indemnify
Kirton for the attorneys" fees and expenses incurred by it in
defending this action.

D.

The court denied Kirton's motion.

Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for Review.

In

1978, Ivan Radman formed Western Fiberglass, Inc. ("Western"), a
Utah corporation, and became its president.

Prior to coming to

Salt Lake City in 1978, Mr. Radman had been a successful
businessman in Australia, where he had owned and managed a

^-Following the trial, Judge Russon denied the motion for a
directed verdict as moot in light of the jury's verdict. Judge
Russon indicated that had the jury returned a verdict for
plaintiff, he would have given "very, very serious consideration"
to granting the motion. Judge Russon also wanted this Court to
know his feelings on this point. Vol. 492 at 17-18.
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construction company and two insulation manufacturing companies.
As the manager

companies
z

negotiated all

Radman personal] y

contracts

50'? at 31 35

Western was formed £oi r.e ourpose of manufacturing
insulation

Following construction

* i ts p3 ant ii :i 19(30, Western

began to produce fiberglass insulation

it also sought potential

f oi t he f; qui I pnienl' i I; had deve 1 i/i'pt-5 i:1 t: :> produce f iberq 1 ass;
insulation

In early 1982, Mi - Radman negotiated a contract for

the sale of equipment to an Italian company

The Italian buyer

i;i.?cjuj t ed W^stei :i : tc :: b tai n and cie 11 i ^ ' er c 3 et: cer of credi t: to
guarantee Western's performance.
drafted this contract.

M- *

Mr

Radman negotiated and

translated :* from English to
•ransaction.

41-45.

Vol.

Later, the Italian company defaulted and made a

claim on Western's letter of credit.
In June

Vol. 50 7 at 45-47.

Western was approached ?w a Virginia

company called United Fiberglass, Inc. ("United")
• '

pi ireh ase of fiberglass
United had previously beei

regarding a

*

. manufacture!

:

»0 7 at; hi
ockwool insulation.

However, after only a week of producing rockwool insulation,
flnited's equi i pmeinl burned up

Ilfn 11 t;idl r ill H I in^iii m e n

loss, and was forced to file a Chapter
United contacted Western, United
ID a

. bankruptcy.

furI he
At the time

attempting to come out of

n k t: u p t c y a s (-i f i b e i«'.) 1 a s s j n s i j J -

151-52.
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i n J (' a t 1 111 • e r

Vn I

"" 11

During the summer of 1982, Robert Bailie, of United, and
Mr. Radman, of Western, negotiated a contract pursuant to which
Western would sell fiberglass insulation manufacturing equipment
tjo United.

After Mr. Bailie and Mr. Radman negotiated the terms

of the contract, United's attorneys drafted a written Equipment
Purchase Agreement in September, 1982, in which Western would sell
the equipment to a Virginia limited partnership, who would then
lease the equipment to United.

Vol. 507 at 51-53.

The agreement

provided, in pertinent part, for deferred payments of a portion of
the purchase price, a security interest to Western in an escrow
account, a letter of credit obligation on the part of Western, and
a default provision entitling Western to remove its equipment upon
United's default.

Exh. 1-P, 1f1f 2.02, 3.01, 3.02, 6.03.

Also, as

part of the transaction, Mr. Radman was to become a member of
United's board of directors and a shareholder and participate in
the management of United.

Vol. 508 at 20.

After the Equipment Purchase Agreement was negotiated and
drafted, Mr. Radman brought the agreement to Dwight Williams at
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell ("Kirton") and asked Mr. Williams to
give it a "quick review."

After reviewing the agreement, Mr.

Williams told Mr. Radman that there were certain provisions of the
contract that were not in Western's best interest, such as the
letter of credit obligation by Western with no corresponding
obligation on the part of United.

Mr. Williams also said he would

have done things differently if he had been involved in the
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negotiations-

Mr. Radman thei 1 askei 1 Mi •. Wi lliams to talk to

Diiiied s attorneys and get them to change the agreement.
flit 4#v 4 7

Vol. s ; = R

1-12.

Whei

Wiil i an.

• dcteci United's attorneys about

changing the agreement, United*s attorneys told him that the
agreement was -

.:o: *- >ax

qotiate it

thincr was • enegotiated, including the price

to be paid -. Western,
Mr. Radman.

tn rene-

dim t *-

?:

Williams reported this conversation to

Mr. Radman

Williams

Western was not

villinq tn i eoperi negotiations and that Western would have to live
with the contract as is

vol. 3 08 at 112 13,

After thi*
signed in May

and until rhn final agreement was
-

Radman consulted with Mr. Williams and

other attorneys at Kirton regarding specifi<
agreement.

\h

-

I fnited's request

^visions io T p

the agreement to reflect
change .: financing from a lease

arrangement

iirect purchase

When the f i

nanged,

Western's r ;

ake back

would be subject

\m* ±±t

(Hi

-3's attorney, Dan McCormack, also told this to

fMilie

Mi " Radman

United * h h bank financing.
Williams told Mr. Radman that

!

t equipment upon default
Vol, 50 8 at 101

509 at 50-51, 162

Both

Because the eq\ li pment sold

by Western was iu ut

liens, United gave Western

a beciiiity interest in a portion of United"s accounts receivable.
Vol, 508 at 114-15; Exh. 11 • P, 1 2.03.
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During the same period of time (September, 1982 through
May, 1983), Mr. Radman negotiated directly with the attorneys for
United.

He wrote to United1s attorneys and they wrote to him.

Vol. 507 at 68-72; Exhs. 2-P, 3-P, 8-D, 102-D.

Mr. Radman spoke

to United's attorneys by phone on numerous occasions without
Western's attorneys present.

Vol. 507 at 64-67; Exh. 52-D; Vol.

509 at 128-29, 140-41, 155-56, 163-66.

He met twice with United's

attorneys in Virginia without Mr. Williams present, including an
all-day meeting one month before the final agreement was signed.
Vol. 509 at 87-88, 153-54, 165; Exh. 123-D at 87-88.

In addition

to receiving correspondence directly from United1s attorneys, Mr.
Radman also received other letters and documents regarding the
transaction, which he neither read nor remembered giving to Mr.
Williams.

Vol. 507 at 73-75.

Shortly before the agreement was signed, Mr. Williams
advised Mr. Radman to have someone at the closing in Virginia who
could make certain that everything was taken care of.

Vol. 508 at

88, 118-19. Mr. Radman said that it would be too expensive to
send someone.

Mr. Williams offered to combine the closing with

another trip he had scheduled to Washington D.C. so that Western
would not have to pay for Mr. Williams' travel time and expenses,
but Mr. Radman said "no" and that he would have United's attorneys
take care of any necessary filings.

Vol. 508 at 79-80, 87-89.

The closing took place in Virginia without either Mr.
Radman or anyone from Kirton present.
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Although Mr. Radman told

Mr

W:i ] liams that he woul:: have United's attorneys take care of

the necessary filings, United*s attorneys did not file any
• i yc i n J I \ t s 11 i t< ] v a 111 e .

f i n a n e i n g s t a t HUP I 11 , 11 in M

^ u 1 IOUL nq t h e

closing, Western manufactured the equipment and installed it in
United's plant in January of 1984
cere a in payments

as < ai'ieci

Ar i hat time Western rpceived
n the agreement.

Two months after installation of the equipment and after
if ii„ i hv

a bad experience with the letter ui UL

Western from :. *~ obligation
V o l . 507

•

85-87; Exh.

!

Italian

Western asked United

release

continue the letter

credit.

4 1 -u.

' *- -

* n~\-> ,r- v

dPI I i Hd

i*

i
r he

»

.

months later, United needed

to borrow additional funds from Sovran Bank, its primary lending
i n s t i t u t I o ri

S o v i a ri I':i a i m Ik w i»111 ti n < 11. a (1 v a, 11 c k« 11111„ h e i t u n d s u n 1 e s s

Western agreed to subordinate its security interest in United's
accounts receivable to that of the bank
subord i itati-11 u

Western agreed

the bcink -mcl -j"!so agree: t-o release its interest in

United s accounts receivable in exchange for United releasing
Western from the letter of credit obligation
1

• 11)i> ,„, Kxhs. 20-P,

lb l\

Vol

MI

33-D,

ai cO-IL*H
19-D

After

Western had subordinated and released its security interest in the
accounts receivable, Mr. Radman told K;,fc'1 - ""'"' • *• thi^se a tions.
Vol- 509 ai ] 05 1 07; Exh

1 7-D.

Then,

:>f 1985, United

went out of business because of problems with the equipment.
509 at 51.

9 -

Vol.

The money United collected from its accounts receivable
was not enough to pay the loans to Sovran Bank.
10-13.

Vol. 509 at

The loans to Sovran Bank were eventually paid by personal

guarantors.

Vol. 510 at 14-15.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Western's case centers on two acts of alleged malpractice:
(1) the alleged failure of Kirton to inform Western that Western's
priority in certain equipment was subordinate to a bank, and (2)
Kirton's alleged failure to perfect a security interest in
accounts receivable of United Fiberglass.

The jury found that

Western had been told that the bank would have a superior interest
in the equipment.

The jury also found that Kirton had a duty to

perfect the security interest in the accounts receivable, but that
Western was 50 percent negligent because of the actions Western
took.
Western appeals the jury's findings on both the equipment
and the accounts receivable claims.

With respect to the equipment

claim, Western alleges prejudicial error because the judge refused
to admit into evidence an affidavit of Robert Bailie, and the
judge refused to admit into evidence certain testimony of Ivan
Radman concerning actions Western claims it would have taken had
it "known" that its right to repossess the equipment would be
subordinate to the rights of the bank.
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• Westeri i's claims about the Bailie affidavit are unfounded
fox three reasons.

First, Mr. Bailie was on the stand at the

request of Westerr
quest it

. surfi

i« Jesieni had ihe opportunity to

.» about the substance of the affidavit

Western c

Second,

:.o- preserve the issue for appeal by making a

proffer.

adence clearly requires

the party to preserve any evidentiary issues by revealing the
substance of the evidence '•

- uuutu

reason whv I he affidri'it

Third, Western offered no

H P admitted into evidence.

Affidavits are classic examples of hearsay evidence, and Western
has claimed no exception to the hearsay i"u,le I hat wnulri justify
admisuion t>t Lhis document into evidence.
Western 1 s allegations of error, as they relate t
exclusion oi the Radman tpstinmny, ha '«•» pven less basis.

>' Nf»
Not only

did Western fail I,n mnkn a proffer, which is grounds in and of
itself for -ejecting Western's argument, but the issue \ ^ m ri
The

I I I ..it WVsteii'i waii I. old that its right

repossess

the equipment would be subordinate to that of; the bank,
evidence rr support this finding.
the

In li'fjht n

Th^re is

,,«"«, finding,

*. .tional testimony regarding what Western

"would have done had it known that its claim would be subordinate
to that of the bank" at best constitute hairnlpss en, 01;
u

aspect to the accounts receivable claim, Western

claims *"*.. errors

{ O that the jury's finding that the plaintiff

was 50 percent negliqetii

evidence, and
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(2) that the jury's determination of the amount of damages is not
supported by the evidence.

Kirton agrees that the jury's

determination of the amount of damages is unsupportable, but,
unlike Western, Kirton claims there is no competent evidence of
damages.

The only evidence that Western introduced to prove

damages was the balance sheet showing the book amount of accounts
receivable.

Western introduced no evidence showing that the

accounts receivable had a fair market value equal to the value
shown on the balance sheet.

As for the question of whether

competent evidence exists to support the finding of 50 percent
comparative negligence, the transcript is replete with testimony
upon which the jury could base its finding, including Western's
refusal to permit Kirton to attend the closing, Western's attempt
to reduce attorney's fees by insisting that United's counsel file
the financing statements (as opposed to Kirton), and Western's
release/subordination of its security interest in the accounts
receivable.
Kirton has filed a cross appeal in this case.

Section

16-10-4(2)(c) of the Utah Business Corporation Act requires a
corporation to indemnify its agent whenever the corporation sues
the agent and the agent prevails.

The jury found that an agency

relationship existed between Kirton and Western.

Kirton also

prevailed in the suit. As such, Kirton should be awarded its
costs and fees incurred in defending this action.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE BAILIE AFFIDAVIT WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM KV1DF.NCE.
Western claims that the trial judge committed prejudicial
error by refusing admission
evidence,

wt -

ihe affidavit of Robert Bailie into

-

* •• is, howpvpi , because ( 1, "i" Robert

Bailie was called by Western as a witness and Western had ample
opportunity *
<

ask questions about the substance of the affidavit;

"--

.t— •

, - -^

;n appeal by making a

proffer of evidence; and (3) Western offered no grounds to the
trial judge for admitting this hearsay testimony i nto evi dence.
A.

Prejudicial Error Did Not occur Because Western Had the
Opportunity to Examine the Affiant About the Substance
of His Affidavit.
Rule 103(a)

* the

error may nnt 1: e pT«

Utah Rules of Evidence states that an
HI npm

H m l ir H 111 ;-i i exc 11 Miles e 'idence

unless a substantial right of the parry is affected
Western attempted tr

At the time

ntroduce the affidavit of Robert Bailie :i nto

evidence, .

un t, lie witness stand, having been

called by Western,, u

\s cr.y*-

Although the Court refused to

permit the affidavit into evidence, nothing prevented Western *'mm
q -

.

J i\P d

subject matter of the affidavit

Vol. 509 at 63-65.
The law

, clear that prejudicial err i::)i: does not c> :n :UJ :

when i lie offei iny party has an opportunity to have the same
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evidence admitted through other means.

Dahnken, Inc., of Salt

Lake City v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986).

See also, First

Realty & Inv. Company, Inc., vs. Rubert, 100 Idaho 493, 600 P.2d
1149 (1979).

There was no objection to Western questioning

Mr. Bailie about the subject of his affidavit.

Western cannot now

complain because it did not take advantage of an opportunity
available to it.
B.

Western's Failure to Make an Offer of Proof Precludes
an Appeal.
Rule 103(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires a

party to make an offer of proof to the Court, or make the
character of the evidence apparent from the context of the
questions asked, in order to preserve for appeal the question of
whether exclusion of the evidence was proper.
enforced this rule literally.

This Court has

See, e.g., State v. Rammel, 721

P.2d 498 (Utah 1986); Hill v. Hartoq, 658 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1983);
Bradford v. Alvev & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980).
Western failed to preserve for appeal its contention that
the trial court improperly excluded the affidavit of Mr. Bailie.
Attached as Addendum 1 is a copy of that portion of the transcript
from the attempted introduction of the affidavit to the point
where Western rested its case (three pages).

Western made no

offer of proof regarding the purpose of introducing the affidavit
into evidence.

Vol. 509 at 63-65 (Addendum 1). Further, Western

failed to ask additional questions that would have indicated the
purpose of introducing the affidavit as evidence.
-14-

Id.

C.

Western Offered the Trial court No Exception to the
Hearsay Rule, And As Such the Exclusion Was Proper.
The Utah Rules of Evidence *^

• .*••

e

exceptions

.>

.*.-.-.:•

v-.ar. E

:\ i

r» •

-.:

*

:>• . : the listed

Bailie

constitutes hearsay : .

o

*.. .t testifying o*

?

•«

*

affidavit clearly
tement made by him

. d . ale 801(c).

Western

hat« offered no basis for admission of this hearsay, either to the
V. I "\ ""U| at; b I-b5 (Addendum, i).

trial judge c

Western has the burden of showing that the hearsay :s admissible,
and it cannot now complain that it failed t
trial

-

hearsay.

]

THE EXCLUSION OF THE RADMAN TESTIMONY WAS AT BEST HARMLESS
ERROR, AND IN ANY EVENT WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL.
Western claims that it was prohibited from introducing
the testimony of Mr. Radman, as president of Western, with respect
to how Western wou

es contract had Western

known that i* cliens.
one Q£

epossess -N equipment free of other

Western claims that the testimony was essential in prnv,inq
^ j i e P ip m p ri | ri

A.

Ili;ij

j | »,, ^ d s e ,, inline I y „ the element of causation.

The Issue of Whether the Testimony Should Have Been
Excluded Is Moot Because the Jury Found That Kirton Did
Not Breach Its Duty.
By way of background, the plaiivl iff in a Ii'»|,i,l

< ;

V P oar." . id pvei y OIH-' of the following

elements in ordei to establish the cause of action:
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(1) That an attorney-client relationship existed;
(2) That the attorney had a duty to the client;
(3) That the attorney failed to perform the duty;
(4) That the client suffered damages; and
(5) That the attorney's negligence proximately
caused the damage to the client.
Stangland v. Brock, 109 Wash. 2d 675, 747 P.2d 464 (1987);
Phillips v. Clancy, 152 Ariz. 415, 733 P.2d 300 (Ct. App. 1986);
Chocktoot v. Smith, 280 Or. 567, 571 P.2d 1255 (1977); R. Mallen
and V. Levit, Legal Malpractice § 657 (2d Ed. 1981) (hereinafter
referred to as "Legal Malpractice").
Western claims that it needed the testimony of Mr. Radman
in order to establish what its position would have been had Kirton
performed properly.

While it is the true that the element of

causation requires the plaintiff to show that it would have
benefited had the attorney performed properly,

that inquiry is

moot in this appeal because the jury found that Kirton did perform
properly.

Vol. 510 at 81-82.

In other words, Western appeals on

the ground that it was precluded from introducing evidence that
damages were proximately caused by the alleged breach of

2

Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894
(Utah 1978)(appropriate to inquire as to what the plaintiff's
position would have been if the attorney had performed the act
properly; Young v. Bridwell, 20 Utah 2d 332, 437 P.2d 686, 689
(1968)(in order to establish a cause of action against an attorney
for failing to advise the plaintiff of the right to appeal,
plaintiff would have to show that there was a reasonable likelihood
of reversing the judgment and that it would have benefited the
plaintiff)•
-16-

duty.

But in fact no breach of duty ever occurred.

Western

failed to prove a critical element of its case (i.e., a breach of
duty), and any error of the trial judge relating to the exclusion
of Mr. Radman's testimony —

which would have gone to the proof of

a different element of the cause of action —

constitutes harmless

error.
The record is replete with evidence to support the jury's
finding that Kirton did not breach its duty of care as it applies
to the equipment claim.

See, e.g., Vol. 508 at 162 (Dan

McCormack); Vol. 509 at 162 (Robert Bailie); Vol. 508 at 101
(Mr. Williams).

Furthermore, Western has not challenged the

jury's finding on this point in its appeal.
B.

Western Has Not Preserved the Issue for Appeal
Because It Failed to Make an Offer of Proof.

As noted earlier in this brief, Rule 103 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence requires a party to make a proffer of evidence
in order to preserve for appeal a question regarding the propriety
of a judge's decision to exclude evidence.

See pages 13 to 14,

supra, for a discussion of Rule 103. Kirton objected to the
Radman testimony on the grounds that the question called for
speculation on the part of the witness.
objection.

The court sustained the

In order to preserve the issue for appeal, Rule 103

required Western to make an offer of the evidence so that the
court could review the evidence and determine whether the basis
for the objection was well founded.
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Western's failure to do so

means that it is now precluded from appealing the ruling because
there is no evidence in the record to support its claim that a
substantial right of the party was affected.

Addendum 2 is that

portion of the transcript wherein Western attempted to introduce
the testimony of Mr. Radman on this issue. Vol. 510 at 27-28.

III.
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE JURY'S FINDING
THAT WESTERN WAS 50 PERCENT NEGLIGENT ON ITS
ACCOUNTS-RECEIVABLE CLAIM.
The jury found that Kirton had a duty to file a financing
statement in order to perfect a security interest in United's
accounts receivable, and that Kirton breached that duty.

The jury

also found that Western was 50 percent negligent in any loss
resulting from the failure to perfect.

Western has appealed the

jury's finding of contributory negligence on the grounds that the
evidence does not support the finding.
There can be no doubt that contributory negligence is a
defense in a legal malpractice claim.

Helmbrecht v. St. Paul

Insurance Co., 122 Wis. 2d 94, 362 N.W.2d 118 (1985); Hansen vs.
Wiqhtman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (Ct. App. 1978); Ishmael
v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (Ct. App.
1966); Legal Malpractice, S 351.

Indeed, Western does not dispute

this principle of law, as is evidenced by its failure to object to
the jury instructions on contributory negligence.

What Western

apparently argues is that the nature of Kirton's breach was such
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that Western could not be contributorily negligent as a matter of
law.

However, none of the cases cited by Western stand for that

proposition.

For example, in Theobold v. Byers, 193 Cal. App.2d

147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864, 866 (Ct. App. 1961), the court held that
"the trial court was correct in holding that contributory
negligence could properly be considered a defense. . . . "

The

court ruled for the plaintiff in this case only because the facts
did not support a finding of contributory negligence.
Similarly, Practical Offset, Inc. v. Davis, 83 111.
App. 3d 566, 404 N.E.2d 516 (1980), another case cited by Western,
addresses only the issue of whether sufficient evidence existed to
support the trial court's granting of summary judgment.

The issue

of contributory negligence was not addressed by the court.

The

only apparent relevance of Practical Offset to the case at hand is
that both involved the failure to file a financing statement and
in both cases the trier of fact found that the attorneys had acted
negligently.

The difference, however, is that in the case at hand

the defendant was able to prove contributory negligence, and in
Practical Offset there is no indication that contributory
negligence was even raised as a defense.
In summary, Western has offered no authority or reason
for the proposition that the doctrine of contributory negligence
should not apply in the current case.

Furthermore, if Western

seriously asserts this theory, it should have objected to the jury
instructions on contributory negligence.
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Rule 51 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits a party from assigning as error
the giving of a jury instruction unless the party objects and
states the grounds for objection.

While an appeals court is not

precluded from examining the question, this Court has held that it
will not entertain a review absent unusual circumstances and a
compelling reason.

E. A. Strout W. Realty Agency, Inc. v. W. C.

Foy & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983); State vs. Bell, 563 P.2d
186 (Utah 1977); Williams v. Lloyd, 16 Utah 2d 427, 403 P.2d 166
(1965).

Western has given no such reason.
With respect to Western's claim that the record does not

support the jury's finding, the standard rule of appellate review
of a jury's verdict is that the verdict will not be disturbed if
there is any reasonable support in the evidence.

Uintah Pipeline

Corp. v. White Superior, 546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976); Barlow
Upholstery & Furniture v. Emmel, 533 P.2d 900 (Utah 1975).

In

this case, the record contains more than reasonable support for
the jury's finding of contributory negligence.

For example,

Western complains that it was damaged because it did not have a
perfected security interest in the accounts receivable.

The

evidence is clear, however, that Western had specifically
subordinated to Sovran Bank, the only other entity with a security
interest in the accounts receivable.

When Sovran finally

foreclosed, there was not enough money to discharge the debt owed
to it.

Vol. 509 at 10-13.

The fact Western had not perfected its

security interest did not mean that Western could not foreclose on
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the collateral. Vol. 508 at 41-42, 131-132, 172. Perfection only
establishes the relative priorities among the parties claiming an
interest in the collateral.

Vol. 508 at 76-77, 91. For some

rfeason, however, Western did not foreclose.

Western's

subordination of its security interest and its failure to exercise
its remedy against the collateral can be found by a jury as
negligence and as contributing to the damages Western suffered.
See, e.g., Fisk v. Newsum, 9 Wash. App. 650, 513 P.2d 1035 (Ct.
App. 1973).
Western also contributed to its own damages by unreasonably restricting its attorneys and by ignoring their advice.

The

record shows that Kirton was not asked to handle the transaction,
but instead only to render advice on specific questions.

Vol. 507

at 53-53, 58, 61-62; Vol. 508 at 63-64; Vol. 509 at 30-31, 34-35,
128-130, 153-157, 164-165. Western did not have Kirton involved
in negotiating the transaction.

Id*

Indeed, Western had numerous

telephone calls, meetings, and correspondence directly with
United*s counsel. Vol. 507 at 61-79; Exhs. 2-P, 3-P, 8-D, 52-D,
102-D, and 123-D.

Western refused to follow its attorneys' advice

to have a lawyer attend the closing to make certain that the
details were properly handled.

Vol. 508 at 88-89, 118-119.

Western preferred instead to let United1s counsel handle the
details, including the filing of a financing statement.

Vol. 508

at 88. All of these restrictions and limitations occurred because
Western was extremely sensitive to legal fees.
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Vol. 508 at

130-131; Exhs. 111-P, 123-D.

Such sensitivity has a risk,

however, and the jury could reasonably find that Western's actions
in limiting its attorneys and its own involvement in the
transaction was negligent and contributed to the loss suffered by
Western.
The courts have held that such actions on the part of a
client can. constitute contributory negligence.

For example, the

Washington Court of Appeals stated in Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash.
App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (Ct. App. 1975) that a client can be
contributorily negligent by failing to provide information to the
attorney or by undertaking a matter and not handling it
correctly.

See also, Fisk v. Newsum, 9 Wash. App. 650, 513 P.2d

1035 (Ct. App. 1973).

And in California, the Court of Appeals

ruled in Theobold v. Byers, 193 Cal. App.2d 147, 13 Cal. Rptr.
864, 866 (Ct. App. 1961), that a client can be contributorily
negligent if the client fails to follow the attorney's advice.
the words of the court:
A patient will thus be barred from recovery for
medical malpractice where the patient has
disobeyed medical instructions given by a doctor
or dentist or has administered home remedies to
an injury without the aid of medical advice.
There would seem to be no reason whatever why the
same rule should not be applicable in a legal
malpractice action where there is evidence that a
client chose to disregard the legal advice of his
attorney. In our opinion, any other rule would
be grossly unfair.
The evidence must be construed in the light most
favorable to the verdict.

Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners,
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In

Inc., 548 P.2d 898 (Utah 1976).

The record shows that the jury

had ample basis for finding Western contributorily negligent, and
this Court should affirm its verdict.
IV.
THE JURY VERDICT ON THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SHOULD BE OVERTURNED
BECAUSE WESTERN FAILED TO PROVE THE AMOUNT OF ITS DAMAGES.
Western has appealed the jury's finding as to the amount
of damages.

In light of the jury's verdict finding Western 50%

negligent, this Court does not need to address the issue of
damages.

If this Court does address damages, then Kirton agrees

with Western that no evidence exists in the record to support the
jury's damage award of $84,000.00.

However, unlike Western,

Kirton claims that the record shows no competent evidence of
damages.
As noted earlier in this brief,

a plaintiff must prove

all of the elements of a legal malpractice cause of action in
order to prevail.
damages.

One of those elements is the existence of

The amount of damages must be proven with reasonable

certainty, or the plaintiff cannot prevail.

Dunn v. McKay,

Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 1978).

This

Court has the power to overturn a jury finding if it believes the
award is based on conjecture or speculation.
Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826 (1958).

3

See pages 15-16, supra.
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Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8

The sole evidence Western introduced to prove damages was
a balance sheet showing the dollar amount owed by debtors of
United and the approximate amount of the loan to Sovran Bank (the
entity to whom Western subordinated its interest in the accounts
receivable).

Western's argument is that the difference between

the two is the amount of damages it suffered.
of damages does not adequately prove its case.

Western's evidence
Western has not,

for example, introduced any evidence to establish the accuracy or
credibility of the balance sheet, such as evidence that an audit
was performed.

Vol. 509 at 21-29, 53-59. Western has not

established that it could have completed a foreclosure action
within the time period of the evidence introduced.

Western

introduced no evidence that the fair market value of the accounts
receivable was equal to its book value.

And Western introduced no

evidence that the accounts receivable were collectible.

In other

words, Western has not shown the value of the security interest
lost; it has only introduced evidence as to the face amount of the
accounts receivable.

The face amount of the accounts receivable

is an improper measure of damages.
In the case of Tilly v. Doe, 49 Wash. App. 727, 746 P.2d
323 (Ct. App. 1987), the court discussed the measure of damages in
a legal malpractice case where the attorney was liable for failing
to perfect a security interest.

The plaintiff in the case argued

that the proper measure of damages was the fair market value of
the collateral.

The court disagreed.
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It said that the plaintiff

was required to prove "the value of the loss of the security
interest, not the value of the personal property." Id.

at 325.

The court defined a number of factors that the plaintiff must show
in proving the determination of the value of a lost security
interest, including evidence of collectability.

The court

specifically noted that the burden of proving collectability rests
with the plaintiff.

IdL at 326, See also, Taylor Oil Company v.

Weisensee, 334 N.W.2d 27, 29 (S.D. 1983).
Like the plaintiff in Tilly, Western failed to put on any
evidence of collectability.

Western has only introduced evidence

as to the book value of the accounts receivable, and this is
insufficient as a matter of law to prove damages.

V
UNDER SECTION 16-10-4(2)(c) OF THE UTAH CODE, KIRTON, AS
THE AGENT OF WESTERN, IS ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FOR
ITS COSTS, EXPENSES AND ATTORNEYS1 FEES INCURRED IN
DEFENDING THIS ACTION.
A.

Agents Are Entitled to Indemnification as a Matter of Law
When They Prevail.
Section 16-10-4(2) of the Utah Business Corporation Act,

which is based upon section 5 of the 1967 Model Business
Corporation Act, sets out a statutory scheme whereby a person may
obtain indemnification for the costs of defending an action
brought against the person and arising out of the performance of
his/her duties as a director, officer, employee or agent.
Subsection (a) of Section 16-10-4(2) authorizes a Utah corporation
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to indemnify any such person for the costs in defending against an
action brought by a third party.
(1987).

Utah Code Ann. S 16-10-4(2)(a)

Subsection (b) authorizes indemnification for costs

incurred if the claim was made by or in the right of the
corporation (as opposed to a third-party claim).
S 16-10-4(2)(b).

Jd.

These subsections are voluntary; corporations

are authorized, but not required, to provide the indemnification
discussed therein, and they do not necessarily require the person
to be successful on the merits.
Subsection (c) of Section 16-10-4(2), on the other hand,
places upon corporations an affirmative obligation to provide
indemnification.

It states that to the extent a person "has been

successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of any action,
suit or proceeding" of either of the types referred to above
(i.e., a third party suit or a suit by or in the right of the
corporation), "he shall be indemnified against expenses (including
attorney's fees) actually and reasonably incurred by him in
connection therewith."

Id. S 16-10-4(2)(c).

Although the Utah courts have not addressed the
interpretation of subsection (c), courts and commentators in other
jurisdictions with the same or similar provisions have uniformly
agreed that the language used in subsection (c) requires a
corporation to provide indemnification to directors, officers,
agents and employees who prevail.

See e.g., McClean v.

International Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 1214, 1221 (5th Cir. 1987);
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Galdi v. Berg, 359 F. Supp. 698, 699-700 (D. Del. 1973); Katayama
v. Interpacific Properties, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 3d 1604, 236 Cal.
Rptr. 108 (Ct. App. 1987) (ordered not published, Rule 976, Cal.
Rules of Ct.); Green v. Westcap Corp. of Delaware, 492 A.2d 260
(Del. Super. 1985); Model Business Corp. Act Anno. § 5 (Supp.
1977) (official comment); Heyler, Indemnification of Corporate
Agents, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 1255 (1976).

Given the plain language of

subsection (c) and the uniformity of decisions of courts and
interpretations of commentators, indemnification of a director,
officer, agent or employee is mandatory when such person prevails.
The trial judge denied Kirton's motion primarily because
the jury found that Kirton had acted negligently, and as such he
did not believe that the statute mandated indemnification.
492 at 19-20.

Vol.

The trial judge reasoned that the finding of

negligence meant that the lawyers had not acted in good faith,
which he read as a prerequisite to mandatory indemnification.

Id.

Subsection (c) mandates indemnification if the agent has
been successful in defense of any suit referred to in subsections
(a) or (b) of the statute.

As noted above, subsection (a)

describes lawsuits brought by a third party against the agent, and
subsection (b) describes lawsuit brought by the corporation or
brought in the right of the corporation (i.e. a derivative
lawsuit).

Those are the lawsuits referred to in subsection (c).

The only time a finding of good faith is necessary is if the
corporation voluntarily elects to indemnify the agent.
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The reason

such a finding is required for voluntary payments is that the
corporation can indemnify the agent even if he is found liable.
Utah Code Ann. S 16-10-4(2)(a)-(b).
This interpretation of the statute is consistent with the
legislative history and court decisions of other jurisdictions
that have adopted similar indemnification statutes.

In Delaware,

the Reporter to the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Commission
originally suggested that the good-faith requirement contained in
subsections (a) and (b) be incorporated into the mandatory
indemnification provisions of subsection (c). This suggestion was
rejected, however.

The legislature instead decided to indemnify

any person who was successful, whether on a technical defense or
otherwise, and even if that person could not meet the standard of
conduct described in subsections (a) and (b). The underlying
policy reason was that the legislature wanted to attract
incorporators to Delaware.

Barrett, Mandatory Indemnification of

Corporate Officers and Directors, 29 S.W.L.J. 727, 733 (1975).
In Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138
(Del. Super. 1974), one of the plaintiffs had been charged with
criminal indictments.

He was subsequently found guilty on one

count and the balance of the charges were dropped.

The plaintiff

requested indemnification under the Delaware indemnification
statute (which is substantively identical to the Utah statute).
The corporation argued that the statute should mandate
indemnification only where there has been vindication by a finding
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or concession of innocence.

The court disagreed.

It said that as

to the matter upon which guilt had been found the plaintiff could
not recover, but as to all other matters, the statute required
ohly that the plaintiff be successful, on the merits or
otherwise.

The court never examined the good faith of the

plaintiffs.
In this case, Judge Russon misinterpreted the statute.
The Utah indemnification statute has been written as broadly as
possible.

It mandates indemnification to successful parties and

it does not care how they arrive at their success.
B.

Kirton Was an Agent of Western and is Entitled to
Indemnification.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines "agency" as

follows:
(1) Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from
the manifestation of consent by one person to another
that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
control, and consent by the other so to act.
Restatement (Second) of Agency S 1 (1958).

Western retained

Kirton to act on its behalf, and Kirton was subject to Western's
control.

The act of retaining Kirton was a manifestation of

consent to Kirton so acting.

Further, Kirton's agreeing to act as

counsel constituted its consent to the relationship.

This

principal-agent relationship is created between every client and
attorney when the attorney is retained to accomplish some act on
behalf of the client or otherwise to assist the client in
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accomplishing an act. This fact is recognized by the Restatement
itself, where in the official comment it states "the
attorney-at-law . . . and other similar persons employed either
for a single transaction or for a series of transactions, are
agents. . . ."

Id. § 1, comment on subsection (3).

That attorneys are agents for purposes of indemnification
has been recognized in at least one other jurisdiction.

In

Katayama v. Interpacific Properties, a defendant-attorney in a
legal malpractice action was specifically found to be an agent of
his client for purposes of the indemnification provisions of the
4
California Corporations Code.
The fact Kirton was sued for alleged malpractice does not
mean that Western can avoid the statutory obligation of
indemnification.

Kirton is entitled to indemnification from

Western for Kirton's costs and expenses, including, without
limitation, attorneys' fees and court costs. All of the
requirements for mandatory indemnification under
Section 16-10-4(2)(c) have been met.

Kirton was an agent of

Western, was sued by reason of undertaking to act as agent, and
has prevailed in the lawsuit.

4

Cal.Corp. Code § 317(d). This subsection is substantively
identical to Utah Code Ann. S 16-10-4(2)(c) (1987). 236 Cal.
Rptr. at 108. As such, the court ruled that the attorney was
entitled to indemnification.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the jury's verdict that Kirton,
McConkie & Bushnell has no liability to Western Fiberglass, Inc.
should be affirmed.

This Court should also reverse the ruling of

the trial judge denying Kirton's motion for indemnity and award
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell its' costs, expenses, and attorney's
fees incurred by it in this action.
DATED this

day of August, 1988.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

<fMm<u) g,
Stephen B. Nebeke
Thomas L. Kay

Attorneys for Defendant Kirton,
McConkie & Bushnell
1484k
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12

The above-entitled cause of action came on

13

regularly for hearing before the Honorable Leonard H.

14

Russon, a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of

15
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16
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Your Honor.

1

2

THE COURT:

I

3 J

Q

Sustained.

(By Mr. Fox)

Did you have any conversations with

4 I Mr. Kay prior to testifying at the deposition?
5 J
I
6 I

MR. KAY:

That calls for hearsay, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Overruled, he can answer that yes or

7 I no.
8

I

9 I

0

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

(By

Did Mr. Kay tell you anything about

Mr. Fox)

10 I the significance between the terns "release -n I

THE COURT:

12 J

(Off the record discussion between Court and

13

Hold on.

M

Let's come up to the bench.

J counsel. )

14 I

THE COURT:

15 I

MR. FOX:

16 1

THE COURT:

Let me see the exhibit.
S2-P and 56-P.
(Pause) I don't have time to look at

17

all of these.

IB

back to tftose.

19

those documents, you may ask your next question.

20

Q

Go aheac with your question.

I will come

If tne question is posed for me to deal with

(By Mr. Fox)

Mr. Bailie, subsequent to your

21

n a v m g had your deposition taKen, did you sign an affidavit

22

relative to a portion of tnat deposition?

23

A

I did.

24

Q

Did you say in your affidavit

25

MR. KAY:

—

Objection, Your Honor.

1

THE COURT:

2 1

Q

Sustained.

(By Mr. Fox)

Subsequent to your having your

3 I deposition taken, did you talk with Mr. Radman regarding
4 I the deposition?
5 I

A

I did.

6 I

Q

And do you recall that conversation?

7

ft

MR. KAY:

Objection, calls for hearsay.

8 I

THE COURT:

9

MR. FOX:

10 J

Sustained.

With Mr. Radman?

(Off the record discussion between Court and

11 I counsel. )
12 J

Q

(By Mr. Fox)

Do you recall a conversation you had

13 I with Mr. Radman after your deposition?
-14 |

A

I do.

15

Q

Do you remember when that conversation was?

16

I

A

The s p e c i f i c

17

•

Q

Do you r e c a l l t h e d a t e ?

A

I do not.

19

Q

Do you recall what you said to Mr. Radman?

20

A

We discussed a number of things in the conversation

Q

Your testimony a little while ago was that you had

IB

21
22
23
24
25

date?

told Mr. Radman, or you were present in conversations with
Mr. Radman where he was told that his right to retake the
possession of the equipment was subject to senior liens.
Do you recall his comments after the deposition regarding that?

A

Yes.

|

Q

What did you tell him?

2 I

A

I reaffirmed that was my recollection of the

2

A

I conversations.

5

I

MR. FOX:

I don't have further q u e s t i o n s .

5 I

MR. KAY:

We have nothing further, Your H o n o r .

7

I

THE COURT:

8

|

MR. KAY:

You may step d o w n .
Your H o n o r , may this witness be e x c u s e d ?

9 J He has to catch a plane back to V i r g i n i a .
10

THE COURT:

n

MR. FOX:

12

THE COURT:

13

M r . F o x , you want this witness excused?]
Yes.
You are also free to leave.

You may

| call your next w i t n e s s .

-j4 I
15 I w i t n e s s e s .

MR. FOX:

Your H o n o r , I don't think we have a n y m o r e

I need to check and make sure our e x h i b i t s are

16 I admitted and a couple of m a t t e r s are cleaned up.
17 J

MR. NEBEKER:

Your H o n o r , we will have a m o t i o n

IB J to m a k e .

I am just wondering in view of time if it would

19 J be appropriate for us to have some time to discuss that
20 J matter with the Court since it is now about 20 to 1 2 .
21 I

THE COURT:

Am I to u n d e r s t a n d , Mr. F o x , that you

22 I are now resting the plaintiff's case with the single
23 J exception of checking exhibits to make sure all are in
24 I that you want in?
25

I

MR. FOX:

Yes.
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THE COURT:
Q

Sustained,

(By Mr. Fox)

In the course o f your negotiations

with the buyers did you ever attempt to negotiate a
1 secured interest in the proprietary equ ipment?

1

A

No, I did not.

Q

Why not?

A

Mr. Williams and the Kirton, Mc Conkie.were

I going to take care of that,>
Q

Take care of it, how do you mean?

A

They were going to secure us, whatever .Lawf uil

J ways to be done*

The only negotiation I made was how much

J equipment I will supply, bolts and nuts , as such.

The

J legal part of it was going to be taken care of by the firm
of Kirton, Mc Conkie.
Q

Did you discuss with anybody security over the

equipment?
A

No, I did not, except that when the agreement

was written, it was discussed what kind of security we
can get and the security that was left over was the accounts
receivable.
Q

Had you known you couldn't take your equipment

back, would your negotiations have been different?
MR. KAY:

Objection, calls for speculation.

THE COURT:
MR. FOX:

Sustained.

May we approach the bench, Your Honor.

27

;

1

J

THE COURT:

You may.

(Off the record discussion between Court and
counsel.

The last question was read back by the reporter.)

4

I

MR. KAY:

5

| of speculation and that is still our objection.

6

I

THE COURT:

7

I

MR. FOX:

8

I questions of this witness.

9

I

You may cross examine.

CROSS EXAMINATION

11

BY MR. KAY:

12

Q

14

Sustained.
Your Honor, we don't have any other

THE COURT:

10

13

Your Honor, we objected on the ground

Mr. Radman, yesterday or Tuesday, I believe you

testified you never borrowed money in Australia; is that
correct?

15

A

No.

16

Q

What did you testify?

17 |

A

I testified we used overdraft.

18 I

Q

Was that like borrowing money?

19 I

A

I presume, if that is what you call it.

20 J

Q

Will you explain to us what an overdraft is?

21 I

A

An overdraft is when you are a good customer of

22 I the bank, they don't ask you to do anything.

They just

23 J increase as they do here in Salt Lake, for that manner.
24 J They just pay your checks as they come through.
25 J

Q

is that money that you necessarily don't have in

ADDENDUM 3

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 16-10-4(2) (a)-(c)
(a) A corporation may indemnify any person who was or is
a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened,
pending, or completed action, suit, or proceeding, whether civil,
criminal, administrative, or investigative, (except not an action
by or in the right of the corporation) by reason of the fact that
he is or was a director, officer, employee, or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the corporation
as a director, officer, employee, or agent of another corporation,
partnership, joint venture, trust, or other enterprise against
expenses, including attorneyfs fees, judgments, fines, and amounts
paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection with the action, suit, or proceeding if he acted in good
faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed
to the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to
any criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe
his conduct was unlawful. The termination of any action, suit
or proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or upon
a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent, shall not, of itself,
create a presumption that the person did not act in good faith
and in a manner which he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed
to the best interests of the corporation, and with respect to any
criminal action or proceeding, had reasonable cause to believe
his conduct was unlawful.
(b) A corporation may indemnify any person who was or is
a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened,
pending, or completed action or suit by or in the right of the
corporation to procure a judgment in its favor by reason of the
fact that he is or was a director, officer, employee, or agent
of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the
corporation as a director, officer, employee, or agent of another
corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, or other enterprise
against expenses, including attorney's fees actually and reasonably
incurred by him in connection with the defense or settlement of
the action or suit if he acted in good faith and in a manner he
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests
of the corporation, except that no indemnification shall be made
in respect of any claim, issue, or matter as to which the person
shall have been adjudged to be liable to the corporation, unless
and only to the extent that the court in which such action or suit
was brought shall determine upon application that, despite the
adjudication of liability but in view of all circumstances of the
case, the person is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity
for such expenses as the court considers proper.
(c) To the extent that a director, officer, employee, or
agent of a corporation has been successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of any action, suit or proceeding referred to in
Subsection 2(a) or (b), or in defense of any claim, issue, or matter
therein, he shall be indemnified against expenses, including attorneys1 fees, which he actually and reasonably incurred in connection
therewith.

ADDENDUM 4
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236 Cal. Rptr. 108 printed in FULL format.
ARTHUR S. KATAYAMA, Cross-complainant and Appellant, v.
INTERPACIFIC PROPERTIES, INC., Cross-defendant and
Respondent.
NO. G002046.
Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District,
Division Three.
190 Cal. App. 3d 1604;

236 Cal. Rptr. 108

April 10, 1987; Respondents petition for review DENIED June
25, 1987 and Reporter of Decisions Directed not to publish
this opn. in the Official Reports (Cal. Const., art. VI, •
14; rule 976, Cal. Rules of Ct.).
Superior Court of Orange County, No. 29-47-35, James Cook, Judge.
MacDonald, Halsted & Laybourne, Gordon E. Bosserman and Karen A. Pikulin for
Sross-complainant and Appellant.
Horvitz, Levy & Amerian, S. Thomas Todd and Frederic D. Cohen for
^ross-defendant and Respondent.
CROSBY
CROSBY, J.
Does the Corporations Code require a corporate plaintiff to indemnify its
ormer lawyer for his costs and attorneys fees after he prevailed in an action
t brought against him for legal malpractice? We hold it does and that the
orporation may not limit its liability to the deductible amount of the
ttorneyfs malpractice coverage.

Interpacific Properties, Inc. sued Arthur S. Katayama for legal malpractice,
laiming he entered into an unauthorized settlement of a multimillion dollar
awsuit on behalf of the corporation. Katayama cross-complained for
Dproximately $12,000 in attorneys fees for his representation of Interpacific
i the underlying litigation and for indemnity for the expenses, including legal
ses, he would incur in defense of the malpractice suit. The latter claim was
ade under Corporations Code section 317, subdivisions (c) and (d).
The malpractice action was tried first and Interpacific lost. n1 Trial on the
*oss-complaint followed, and the court awarded Katayama $12,637.76 on his cause
• action for fees earned while serving as Interpacific's counsel. The court
irther found Katayama was an agent of the corporation within the meaning of
>rporations Code section 317, subdivision (a), that he was successful in his
sfense of the action brought by the corporation, and that he reasonably
curred expenses, including attorneys fees, in the sum of $137,041.21 to defend
e malpractice action.
n1 Interpacific may have a decent malpractice action now . It noticed an
peal from the judgment in the main action, but it was twice dismissed for
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its counsel's failure to follow required procedures and twice reinstated upon
lis application. The appeal was finally dismissed on March 28, 1985, for failure
to deposit costs for the preparation of the appellate record, (Cal. Rules of
Sourt, rule 10(c).) We rejected a third motion to revive the appeal many months
later brought by Interpacific's current attorneys who were not involved in the
natter previously.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that Corporations Code section 317,
subdivision (d) 'was intended and applies to the situation where an agent of a
corporation successfully defends against an action by a third party or against a
lerivative action by the corporation, and that it does not apply to the
situation where, as in the present case, the corporation in a non-derivative
ype proceeding sues its agent, even if the agent prevails in the action.*
'udgment was entered for Interpacific on Katayama's cause of action for
ndemnification under the Corporations Code. Katayama appeals from that portion
>f the judgment.
I
The Legislature added section 317 to the Corporations Code in 1975, effective
anuary 1, 1977. (Stats. 1975, ch. 682, 0 7, p. 1541.) It was based on language
n the American Bar Association Model Business Corporations Act, section 5, and
s virtually identical to corresponding legislation in New York, Delaware, Ohio,
nd other states. Subdivision (a) of section 317 furnishes definitions for
arious terms. For example, 'agent' is defined as anyone who has served a
orporation in the capacity of 'director, officer, employee or other agent . . .
' And "'proceeding' means any threatened, pending or completed action or
roceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative or investigative . . . .'
Expenses' include attorneys fees and all costs reasonably incurred to establish
ie right to indemnification. Subdivision (b) provides for indemnification of
iy agent who is or is threatened to be a party to any proceeding other than
ie 'by or in the right of the corporation . . . .' Traditionally, this hasmeant
:orporate agents may seek indemnification for third party civil actions
id criminal prosecutions.
Subdivision (c) provides, 'A corporation shall have power to indemnify any
*rson who was or is a party . . . to any [] pending or completed action by or
\ the right of the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor by reason of
ie fact that such person is or was an agent of the corporation, against
cpenses actually and reasonably incurred by such person in connection with the
ifense or settlement of such action if such person acted in good faith . . . .'
talics added.) Subdivision (d) mandates indemnification of the agent '[t]o the
tent [he] has been successful on the merits in defense of any proceeding
ferred to in subdivision (b) or (c) . . . .'
The language in section 317, subdivisions (c) and (d) is straightforward and
ambiguous; and its literal terms require indemnification of an attorney who
ccessfully defends a legal malpractice action brought by a former corporate
ient. Nevertheless, we recognize that commentators invariably discuss
bdivision (c) only as it relates to derivative actions, as that term is used
the corporate context, i.e., a lawsuit by one or more shareholders on behalf
the corporation. (See, e.g., 1 Marsh, Marsh's Cal. Corporation Law (2d ed.
85 supp.) Executive Compensation and Indemnification, • 9.36, pp. 536-537; 1
llantine & Sterling, Cal. Corporation Laws (4th ed. 1985) Indemnification and
surance, • 109.01, p. 6-39; Heyler, Indemnification of Corporate Agents
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.*
*.c^ .1 / l n t e r p a c m c attempts to put
its own lyrics to the melody * *
r articles*. It argues subdivision (c) must
only apply when the corporation and agent are on the 'same side ;,* . _
litigation,' e.g., when disgruntled minority shareholders sue, or when the
corporation sues a third party who n turn cross-complains against the agent,
Fed-Mart Corp . v. Pell EnterpriM*
~#*~~~* - - -a«j A(jp
^ 218-21 h
[166 Cal.Rptr. 525]. )
In support of i ts contention Interpacif ic suggests there is r* <::<- ^n^ if i the
predecessor
statute, former Corporations Code section 830, to lend support to
Katayama f s f distort[ed]' interpretation of section 317. Not so. Former section
830 provided in part, * (a) When a person is sued, either alone or with others,
because he is or was a director, officer, or employee of a corporation, [] in
any proceeding arising out of his alleged misfeasance or nonfeasance in the
performance of his duties or out of any alleged wrongful act against the
corporation or by the corporation, indemnity for his reasonable expenses,
including attorneys* fees incurred in the defense of the proceeding, may be
assessed against the corporation, [] by the court in the same or a separate
Droceeding, if both of the following conditions exist: [P] (1) The person sued
is successful in whole or in part, or the proceeding against him is settled with
;he approval of the "court. [P] (? N -ru~
:rt finds th^t *:.-,:, conduct fa iv 1> ar id
equitably merits such indemnity.
"[Text omitted.]
' d) I'his section applies to all pnoceedinfi 'Spec i fie d "»""" subdivision (a>,
-_..ei brought by the corporation, its receiver, its trustee, one or more of
ts shareholders or creditors, any governmental body, any public official, or
.ny private person or corporation, domestic or foreign. , , .'" (Ita lies added.)
We have located only one California appellate opinion discussing &.
ight to indemnification for successfully defending a direct action b>
orporation under former section 830, and it is of no assistance to
nterpacific. In New Capital for Small Businesses, Inc . v. Saunders
~e
al.App.2d 728 [30 Cal.Rptr. 563], a corporation obtained a judgmen ac-a-'..
ttorney, who was also a director, on a common count for money had and received
ased on unauthorized payments to himself of commissions from the sale of
^rporate stock. Notwithstanding the corporation's success, the attorney sought
identification under section 830. The court dismissed his contention because Ile
is not the successful party, but the opinion never suggests an agent who
"evails in P Hircrt «/-••;-- py ^i ie corporation could not recover his fees.
Case law interpreting the current statute and its out-of-state cousir
>arse, and there is none to our knowledge from California courts. But w* ^
>cated two opinions from other jurisdictions, and they support Katayama's €
sition. In Professional Ins. Co. * , Barry (1969) 60 Misc.2d 424 [303 N.Y
d
6 ] , a corporation sued a former director for breach of fiduciary duty, oss-complained for indemnity under the applicable New York statute, Business
rporation Law section 722, which is similar to our section 317. The opinion is
t clear on the point, but the director apparently undertook his relationship
th Professional at the request of another corporation, Schapiro & Co., Inc.
e court conceded he was entitled to indemnification from Professional if he
evailed and met the other requisites of the statute ( id., 303 N.Y.8.2d at p.
D) and concluded he might be entitled to indemnification from Schaoiro as

n.
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In Lawson v. Young (1984) 21 Ohio App.3d 190 [486 N.E.2d 1177] the receiver
Tor an insolvent corporation sued the directors for fraud. The directors
prevailed; but the trial court refused to award attorneys fees under Revised
Sode 1701.13(E)(3), which i6 identical to our statute. The appellate court
reversed, observing, 'Clearly, had [the corporation] brought the action against
[the directors] alleging fraud and mismanagement . . . and had [the directors]
successfully defended 6uch an action, [the corporation] would have been
obligated pursuant to R.C. 1701.13(E)(3) to indemnify [the directors] for their
expenses incurred in the successful defense of such an action.9 ( Id., 486
Nl.E.2d at p. 1179.)
We see no logical reason to view Katayama's position any differently.
Corporations may be treated as persons under the law in general, but they are
creatures of statute and subject to a wide range of rules and obligations not
imposed on individuals. In the context of litigation expenses, a rationale for
disparate treatment is not difficult to divine. Corporations may only operate
through agents by their very nature, and they are frequently wealthy and able to
pursue prolonged and complex litigation that few individuals could afford to
defend. And a direct suit by a corporation is no less costly to defend than the
same claim brought as a derivative action by minority shareholders. In the
latter situation, of course, the successful agent is unquestionably entitled to
indemnification. Thus, we see nothing in the statute itself, or the apparent
policy behind it, supportive of Interpacific's argument.
Ill
Katayama's legal malpractice insurer retained an attorney who represented him
both in his capacity as a defendant and cross-complainant. The reasonable
expenses for the defense of the main action alone totaled $137,041.21, according
to the trial court's findings. Of this sum, however, Katayama's out-of-pocket
expenses were only $1,000, his deductible under the malpractice policy.
Interpacific's final contention is that if it must indemnify Katayama, it is
responsible only for that $1,000. Again we disagree.
A similar argument was rejected by Division One of this court in Fed-Mart
Corp . v. Pell Enterprises, Inc., supra, 111 Cal.App.3d 215. There, the trial
judge determined the corporation's former president, Sol Price, was entitled to
indemnification from Fed-Mart and ordered the corporation to pay him $73,600.
Price had 'an informal' fee arrangement with his counsel: '[T]he attorney would
be entitled to receive fees only after Price's right to indemnification had beer
established by the court. The amount of attorney fees was to be whatever the
trial court determined to be 'reasonable' . . . .' (Id., at p. 228.) Based on
this understanding, Price actually paid $50,000 to his lawyers during the course
of the litigation. On appeal Fed-Mart launched a two-pronged attack on the
award: First, it argued its obligation to indemnify should be limited to Price's
out-of-pocket expenses. Second, Fed-Mart contended the arrangement constituted i
contingent fee agreement which was 'not subject to indemnification under sectior
317 because the fees were not 'actually incurred.'" ( Id.f at p. 229.)
The Court of Appeal disagreed: 'Fed-Mart's argument assaults a straw man. The
trial court determined . . . what legal expenses were actually incurred and
their reasonableness. The court's assessment was based upon statutory duties
imposed on Fed-Mart and the court, not upon any arrangement, contingent or
otherwise, existing between Price and his attorney .' ( Ibid ., italics added.)
The same logic applies in this situation as well.

190 Cal

* pp

3d 1604; 236 Cal

Rpt i
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indemnified against expenses actually and reasonab lj ' incurred by t he ayvtil
.
.f Actual payment by the agent is not a prerequisite to the right to
indemnification. Katayama reasonably incurred legal expenses of- $137,04 (k
n
order to defend Interpacific's complaint. That his legal malpractice insurei was
obligated, pursuant to a wholly unrelated contract, to assume the financial
burden of providing his defense does not alter the fact that the expenses were
actually incurred or that Interpacific had a statutory obligation to pay them.
n2 In other words, having lost on the merits, Interpacific is not entitled to be
treated as a third party beneficiary of Katayama*s policy. (See also Staples v.
Hoefke (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1397, 1410 [235 Cal.Rptr, 165], where the Court of
Appeal affirmed an award of attorneys fees under Civ. Code, 0 1717: * Plaintiffs
were not entitled to avoid their contractual obligation to pay reasonable
attorney fees based on the fortuitous circumstance that they sued a defendant
who obtained insurance coverage providing- a defense.')
n2 We note that Katayama does not stand to enjoy a windfall «A i i)
reimbursement he receives, according to his counsel's undisputed
representations, is payable to his insurer. The expenses were incurred because
of Interpacific's conduct and were entirely beyond the carrier's cont r ol Thi is.
as between Interpacific and the insurer, it makes perfect sense that
Interpacific bear the cost
Judgment rever seel, Appe i iai it is entitled to costs on appea i , i • i I i g
orneys fees, to be determined on remand by t h e trial court.
Trotter, P. I
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